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ABSTRACT

In several recent decisions, Illinois courts have established that an exemployee may be restrained from using information from their former
employer, that will be "inevitably disclosed", even when no non-competition
agreement existed between the employee and the employer. The use of this
"inevitable disclosure" doctrine allows Illinois courts to create quasi noncompetition agreements even where there has been no actual or threatened
misappropriation of an employer's information. This comment proposes that
Illinois courts should apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine only when
several limiting factors are met and, instead, should encourage employers to
use reasonable confidentiality agreements so that neither the employer's
nor the ex-employee's rights are infringed.

Copyright © 2003 The John Marshall Law School
Cite as 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 379

THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS:
IS IT AN INEVITABLE MISTAKE?
JULIET RUTH OTTEN*

INTRODUCTION
Rapid technological innovation in the fast-paced world of commerce has led
business entities to become increasingly concerned with protecting their intellectual
property rights. In particular, companies want to protect their trade secrets.1 Trade
secrets can be more valuable
than gold to businesses because they are often the
"secret" to their success.2 Businesses struggle to keep their trade secrets concealed
after employees leave to work for competitors or to start their own business. 3 Both
companies and courts recognize that employee knowledge and mobility increases the
chances that trade secrets will be misappropriated and, as a result, implement
4
different means of dealing with such situations.
* J.D. Candidate, June 2003; B.S. Chemistry, The University of Detroit Mercy, 2000. The
author would like to thank her editors, Chris Wallace and Mark Hopkins, and the entire RIPL staff
for their guidance and belief in her. She would also like to thank her family for their love and
support.
I See generally Matthew K. Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non -Competition
Agreement Exists.*Additional Guidance Needed, 6 B.U. J. Sm. & TECH. L. 9, § 1 (2000) (discussing
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the case law around the country applying the doctrine, the
possible ramifications in allowing courts to implement the doctrine, and the idea that changes need
to be made regarding the application of the doctrine). The definition of a trade secret is:
A formula, process, device, or other business information that is kept confidential
to maintain an advantage over competitors; information - including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process - that (1)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known or readily ascertainable by other who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure and use, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts, under the
circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (7th ed. 1999). According to Justice Burger of the United States
Supreme Court, "[t]rade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of
industry ...." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
2 Anne Marriott, Companies Gamble on Keeping Secrets, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 20,
1997, at B6. The Coca-Cola Company has kept a copy of their secret soda formula in a bank vault in
Atlanta for over one hundred years. Id. Coca-Cola has gone through the trouble to do this because
keeping a recipe secret could mean for companies, and has meant for Coca-Cola, billions of dollars in
profits. Id. Another example of a company whose "lifeblood" lies in their trade secrets is Kentucky
Fried Chicken. Id. Kentucky Fried Chicken keeps their recipe of the Colonel's eleven herbs and
spices in a time capsule that is guarded around the clock in a secret hideaway. Id.
3 Stephan L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Employees' Duties and Liabilities."Protecting
Employer Confidences, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS: WHAT PLAINTIFFS & DEFENDANTS
HAVE TO KNOW, at 347, 349 (citing PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 581,
1998) which states that factors such as employee mobility and increased competition have
influenced the increased need for employers to protect their intellectual property.
4 Miller, supra note 1, at § 1. Companies have used non-competition, or restrictive, covenants
to ensure that employees will not use trade secrets and confidential information for a certain time
after their employment has ceased. Id.; see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th
Cir. 1996) (enjoining the defendant, Redmond, from assuming his responsibilities at Quaker for a
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In Illinois, companies have used non-competition agreements to restrain
employees from using trade secrets after their employment ceases with that
employer. 5 Illinois courts strictly construe these non-competition agreements. 6 The
Seventh Circuit's decision to use the inevitable disclosure doctrine in the case of
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmoncdl has made it possible for employers to protect trade secrets
without the existence of non-competition agreements. When broadly applied, the
inevitable disclosure doctrine operates like a judicially imposed non-competition
agreement. 8 The doctrine allows courts to create quasi non-competition agreements
in situations where no agreement originally existed or where there has been no
actual or threatened misappropriation. 9
Part I of this comment provides an overview of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act,
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, non-competition agreements, and the PepsiCo
decision. Part II analyzes various Illinois court cases after PepsiCo in order to
establish that the courts are implementing "agreements" for which the parties never
bargained. Part II also compares the policies underlying inevitable disclosure with
the policies of why the courts should not create non-existent agreements. Part I1
introduces a possible solution that will allow Illinois courts to use the inevitable
disclosure doctrine without being accused of creating agreements. The proposal
includes the following: 1) encouraging employers to use reasonable confidentiality
agreements instead of non-competition agreements, and 2) setting forth specific
guidelines for the courts to follow in order to effectively use the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. Part IV concludes with the idea that Illinois courts can help companies
protect their trade secrets while helping employees protect their rights.

certain time period and forever preventing him from disclosing plaintiffs trade secrets). The court
invoked the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a means of restricting Redmond's, the employee,
behavior and duties because Redmond's misappropriation of PepsiCo's trade secrets was "inevitable"
in his new employment with PepsiCo's competitor, Quaker. Id.
See PCx Corp. v. Ross, 522 N.E.2d 1333, 1339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that if a party
voluntarily signs a restrictive covenant in exchange for consideration, and the effects of the
agreement on the party and the public are reasonable, the court will enforce the covenant).
6 Ross, 522 N.E.2d at 1339. Courts have found that non-competition agreements sometimes
impose restraints on trade, thus the agreements are carefully scrutinized and strictly construed. Id.
See also Instrumentalist Co. v. Band, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill. App. 50, 1985); andHydroaire, Inc.
v. Sager, 424 N.E.2d 719 (Ill. App. 5th 1981).
7 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271.
8 See Lawrence F. Carnevale, SpreadingNationwide? Is the Country Ready for the Inevitable
DisclosureDoctrine, 12 THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR 11 (May 1998) (discussing how courts around
the country have adopted and interpreted the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
9 See James Pooley, Fifty-Seventh Judicial Conference on the Third Circuit:Looking Forward
to the Next Millennium.*The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1181, 1186
(1997) (discussing what the author, in looking to the future of intellectual property law, deems as
the ten most important trade secret issues). The extension of trade secret protection by the courts
using the inevitable disclosure doctrine is obvious in view of the Illinois Trade Secret Act, which
states that only "actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined." Ill. Trade Secrets Act 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/3 (1988).
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I. THE WORDS AND POLICIES OF THE ILLINOIS TRADE SECRETS ACT, THE INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE, THE NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS AND THE PEPSICO
DECISION.

A. The Illinois Trade Secrets Act
The Illinois legislature has codified its version of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act in the Illinois Trade Secrets Act 10 (hereinafter "ITSA").11 Section 2 of the ITSA
defines the terms "misappropriation," and "trade secret." 12 Section 3 outlines the
remedies available when misappropriation of trade secrets occurs. In particular, the
ITSA permits the courts to preserve the secrecy of trade secrets through injunctions
and protective orders.1 3 Illinois courts have used the ITSA to fashion remedies to
protect the original employer from loss of its trade secrets in cases where there has

10§ 1065.
11 Compare 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/1-9 (1988) with Unif. Trade Secrets Act 14 U.L.A. 433
(1990) and Unif. Trade Secrets Act 15 U.L.A. 433 (1980). The ITSA was enacted by the Illinois
legislature in 1988 and is the law that governs the courts and acts as a set of guidelines in deciding
trade secret cases. 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 31:1 (Melvin F. Jager ed., 2002).
12 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/2 (1988). Section 2 contains definitions of "improper
means," "misappropriation," "person," and "trade secret" in order for the courts to determine
whether in fact trade secret misappropriation has taken place. Id. Precisely, the ITSA defines
'misappropriation" as:
(1) acquisition of a trade secret of a person by another person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(2) disclosure or use of a trade secret of a person without express consent or
implied consent by another person who:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
knowledge of the trade secret was:
(I) derived from or through a person who utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II)

acquired

under circumstances

giving rise to a duty to

maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.
The Act goes on to define a "trade secret" as:
[I]nformation, including but not limited to, technical or non-technical data, a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing,
process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers that:
(1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.
Id.
13 See -d. § 1065/3 (providing: (1) actual or threatened misappropriation to be enjoined; (2) an
injunction conditioning future use if it would be unreasonable to prohibit future use due to an
overriding public policy; or (3) affirmative acts to protect trade secrets).
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been actual or threatened misappropriation. 14

B. The Inevitable Diselosure Doctrine
The inevitable disclosure doctrine is not specifically discussed in the ITSA or
any other piece of legislation. The doctrine involves the notion that employees may
obtain knowledge and information that is so specialized that future work in the same
field, but for a different employer, should be precluded. 15 The theory is that when
employees leave their positions to start their own businesses or to work for a
competitor, their new duties suggest that they will inevitably disclose the secret
information and hurt the former employer. 16 Courts use the doctrine to enjoin an
employee from working for a competitor even though the employee never actually
used, disclosed, or even threatened to use or disclose the former employer's trade
secrets.17

The first policy supporting the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is that
Illinois recognizes the concept of "threatened misappropriation."1 8 The doctrine is
used to establish the existence of a threat of trade secret misappropriation by a
former employee's inevitable disclosure to their new employer. 19 This concept makes
it easier for employers to show threatened misappropriation rather than actual
misappropriation. Secondly, Illinois has a broad definition of trade secrets; 20 thus,
more businesses are eligible to bring suit against more employees. 21 This policy
14 Id.

(referencing the decisions of some of the Illinois courts and their interpretation of the

ITSA).
15 1 JAGER, supra note 11, § 7:6. Bradford Lyerla states, "[v]ery simply, the doctrine authorizes
an injunction as a prophylactic to prevent a future misappropriation of trade secrets by a departing
employee who is going to work for a business rival. Under the doctrine, an injunction may be
available even if the employee signed no noncompete agreement." Bradford P. Lyerla, Thirteen
Rules For Inevitable Disclosure Trials, 15 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 10 (1998) (exploring the four
inevitable disclosure cases the author was involved in, explaining what the doctrine is, and giving
thirteen rules to follow when litigating inevitable disclosure cases).
16 Soo 1 JAGER, supra note 11, § 7:6. See also Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An
Accession LawApproach to the Inevitable Misappropriationof Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271,
276 (1998) (stating that the inevitable disclosure doctrine posits that "an employee who has been
exposed to her employer's trade secrets will inevitably disclose or use those secrets in the course of
her new employment.... ").
17 See Pooley, supra note 9, at 1186.
18Se 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/2 (1988); see also text accompanying note 12; Johanna L.
Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?." The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 26
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 717, 718 (1996) (critiquing the PepsiCo case). Edelstein states: "IT]he
crucial difference between traditional threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclosure is that
the latter may be enjoined without proof of intent to disclose." Id.at 725-26 (citing DiBoise &
Berger, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 20 NEW MATTER 28 (1995)).
19Susan Street Whaley, The Inevitable Disasterof Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV.
809, 837 (1999) (explaining the reasons for the increased utilization of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine in courts across America, and describing the uncertainties and negative consequences that
go along with using the doctrine to protect employers and their trade secrets).
20
21

See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/2 (1988); see also text accompanying note 12.
See Whaley, supra note 19, at 838. Due to increased employee mobility and to increased

value of intellectual property, employers have been confronted with "the departure of employees who
could destroy their business merely by working for a competitor." Id.
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broadens the blanket of protection given to an employer. 22 Finally, the doctrine
allows courts to provide employers with extra methods of protection, such as
injunctive relief,23 in a competitive business world that thrives on trade secret
protection. 24 The policy reasons that support the inevitable disclosure doctrine
25
encourage Illinois courts to implement the doctrine.

C. Non-Competition Agreements
Simply put, a non-competition agreement is an agreement between an
employer and an employee that the employee will not compete with the employer
upon completion of his or her employment. 26 This type of contract is enforceable if
there is a legitimate business purpose, an employment contract, or a protection of a
special business interest. 27

In Illinois, the non-competition agreement must be

subordinate to the contract's main purpose and there must be adequate consideration
to support the agreement. 28 A non-competition agreement prevents "the promisor
from competing with the promisee, either individually or as an employee of a
competitor . . . " and purports "to bar the promisor from both activities within a
...29
specified geographical area for a given period of time after leaving.
22

Id. (citing James L. Dam, Employees Kept from CompetingDespite Lack of a Non -Compete,

LAW. WKLY. USA, Dec. 15, 1997, at 13). Whaley states that this policy also keeps employers from
being "caught off guard" by the expansive definition of trade secrets. Id., at 838.
23 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/3 (1988). See also text accompanying note 13.
24 Whaley, supra note 19, at 839. The courts strictly construe non-competition agreements,
and companies who did not implement such a covenant may be caught off guard by the sudden
increase in employee mobility. Id. As a result, courts use the doctrine as an alternative to allow
competitors to protect their valuable secrets and remain competitive in an increasingly harsh
marketplace. Id.
25 Miller, supra note 1, at § 2. General policies for trade secret protection exist in addition to
the policies specifically used in support of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. These general policies
include: 1) the incentive for employers and independent business owners to create would lower if
innovations were not protected from competition; 2) without trade secret law, businesses would have
to spend large amounts of money to prevent theft of trade secrets; and 3) trade secret law is a means
of formalizing and protecting industry norms. Id.
26 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 13:4. A non-competition agreement is also known as a restrictive
covenant because, by definition, it is a restraint on trade. Id. A non-competition agreement is
different from a confidentiality agreement. A confidentiality agreement is an instrument used only
"to protect and preserve trade secrets and other valuable confidential information." Id. § 13:3. With
such an agreement, the employee agrees to protect the employer's trade secrets during and after
employment in exchange for some consideration. Id. A confidentiality agreement lacks the restraint
on trade that goes along with a restrictive covenant because it is not an agreement not to compete.
Id.
27 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 13.4. Trade secrets are special business interests that need
protection. Id. Non-competition agreements will be enforced if the restrictions are reasonable under
the circumstances. Id. The reasonableness factors that courts examine when construing a noncompetition agreement include: 1) that a legitimate business purpose exists; 2) that there is a
legitimate business interest to protect; and 3) that the time, subject matter, and territory
restrictions are reasonable. Id.
28 2 JAGER, supranote 11, § 3 1:23.
29 Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silenee, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 151,
155 (1998) (discussing the employee/employer relationship when, at the same time employees are
encouraged to "blow the whistle" on employers wrongdoings, employers are using confidentiality
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There are underlying policies that favor the use of non-competition
agreements in employment situations. 30 First, the freedom to contract is favored
over judicially-created agreements. 31 Second, the agreement protects the employer
during the term of the contract if the employee were to go to work for a competitor
during that period. 32
Third, non-competition agreements protect employers'
customer relationships. 33 Non-competition policies protect all parties involved.

D. PepsiCo,Inc. v. Redmond
In PepsiCo,the plaintiff (hereinafter "PepsiCo") sued the defendants William
Redmond, Jr. (hereinafter "Redmond") and Quaker Oats Company (hereinafter
"Quaker"). 34 PepsiCo sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Redmond, a former
employee of PepsiCo, from disclosing PepsiCo's trade secrets and confidential
information in his new job with Quaker and from assuming any duties at Quaker
that related to his former duties.3 5 The trade secret issues in the case involved
PepsiCo's "All Sport," which directly competed with Quaker's "Gatorade," and
PepsiCo's venture with Ocean Spray and Lipton, which directly competed with
36
Quaker's "Snapple."
Redmond worked for PepsiCo from 1984 to 1994.37 Redmond's management

agreements to protect their secrets, and also discussing several factors that should be viewed as
relevant to the enforceability of confidentiality agreements against "whistleblowers").
30 But see Nathan Hamler, The Impending Merger of the Inevitable Diselosure Doctrine and
Negative Trade Secrets: Is Trade Secret Law Headed in the Right Direction?, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L.

383, 389 (2000) (depicting the policies against non-competition agreements, which include the
following: 1) the free mobility of labor; 2) the employees' livelihood depends on his ability to change
jobs and take advantage of other opportunities; 3) the restraint on trade; and 4) an employees' rights
are violated if the employer is allowed to use an agreement to monopolize such skill without solid
grounds for doing so).
'
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note (1981).
The
freedom to contract allows the parties to bargain for the terms under which they will later be bound
by. Farnsworth and Young state that the freedom of contract is the most powerful symbol of the
rules of contract law. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS CASES AND
MATERIALS VI (5th ed. 1995).
32 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 13:4.
33 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 31:24. The employee would not have had contact with the
customer but for the employer, and that relationship often involves confidential information;
therefore, the non-competition agreement protects the customers' interest. Id.
'3 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263.
3,Id. PepsiCo's case against Redmond and Quaker was not the typical trade secrets case in
which an employee knows of a former employers manufacturing process or customer list and, as a
result, gives the competitor an unfair advantage by using the former employer's technology or by
stealing their customers. Id. at 1265. For an example of typical cases see GlanayreElectronics, Ltd.
v.Sandal, 830 F. Supp. 1149, (C.D. Ill. 1993) seeking an injunction to prevent trade secret use of
paging technology; Stampede Too] Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 1995 Ill. App. LEXIS 170 (March 22,
1995) seeking an injunction to prevent use of customer lists.
36 Id. at 1264. The facts of the PepsiCo case are a great illustration of the fierce competition
that exists in the beverage industry. Id. at 1263.
37 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. Redmond was promoted to the General Manager of the Northern
California Business Unit in 1993, and in 1994 he was promoted to General Manager of all of
California's Business Units. Id.
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position at PepsiCo required him to sign a confidentiality agreement 38 because he
39
had access to confidential information and trade secrets.
In 1994, Donald Uzzi, a former PepsiCo employee who worked for Quaker,
offered Redmond a job.40 Redmond kept all of his negotiations with Quaker secret
from PepsiCo. 41 Quaker finally offered Redmond a Vice President position, and after
some intentional miscommunications with the people at PepsiCo, Redmond became
42
an employee of Quaker.
PepsiCo brought suit against Redmond, and after showing his intimate
knowledge of their secrets, PepsiCo argued that Redmond would inevitably disclose
their trade secrets in his new position. 43
Quaker responded by arguing that
Redmond's primary duties would involve integrating Snapple and Gatorade
according to a pre-existing plan and that any knowledge he gained at PepsiCo would
be irrelevant to such duties. 44 Quaker also argued that Redmond had signed a
confidentiality agreement with PepsiCo, thus preventing him from disclosing any
45
confidential information.
After reviewing all the arguments, the Seventh Circuit enjoined "Redmond from

38 Id.

The confidentiality agreement stated in pertinent part that Redmond:

[W]ould not disclose at any time, to anyone other than officers or employees of
[PepsiCo], or make use of, confidential information relating to the business of
[PepsiCo]. . . obtained while in the employ of [PepsiCo], which shall not be
generally known or available to the public or recognized as standard practice.
Id.,* see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between noncompetition agreements and confidentiality agreements).
3) PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. First, Redmond was privy to PepsiCo's annually revised "Strategic
Plan," which included plans to compete, financial goals, strategies for marketing, production,
manufacturing, packaging, and distribution. Id. at 1265. Second, Redmond knew about a national
Annual Operating Plan for a given year, which included financial goals, marketing plans,
promotional events, growth expectations, and operational changes. Id.
Third, Redmond had
knowledge of "attack plans" for specific markets, for example, PepsiCo had planned to spend certain
amounts of money on supporting its brand against a competitor in a certain market. Id. Last,
Redmond had knowledge of PepsiCo's secret innovations regarding delivery and selling systems. Id.
at 1266.
40 Id. at 1264. Uzzi's original attempts to employ Redmond at Quaker were unsuccessful at
first because Redmond was holding out for more money. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. After having already accepted Quaker's offer, Redmond told many PepsiCo employees,
including his supervisor, that he was thinking about accepting the offer and that the offer was for
the position of Chief Operating Officer. Id.
43 Id. at 1266. Redmond's duties at Quaker would require him to give input regarding pricing,
costs, margins, distribution systems, products, packaging, and marketing. Id. All of these duties
related to the job Redmond held with PepsiCo, thus he would give Quaker an unfair advantage in
any upcoming conflicts Quaker might encounter with PepsiCo. Id.
4 Id.
Redmond's duties pertaining to the integration of Snapple and Gatorade would
eventually involve the managing of the distribution, promotions, marketing, and sales of the
products. Id.
4 Id. Redmond promised that, pursuant to the confidentially agreement that he signed with
PepsiCo, if a situation arose at Quaker that involved a possible conflict with the information he had
about PepsiCo, he would consult Quaker's in-house counsel and refrain from making any final
decision about the situation. Id. Quaker's Code of Ethics also prohibited Redmond from disclosing
any of PepsiCo's confidential information because it required that employees are not allowed to
engage in, "illegal or improper acts to acquire a competitor's trade secrets." Id. (quoting the Quaker
Code of Ethics).

[2:379 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

assuming his responsibilities at Quaker through May, 1995, and preventing him
forever from disclosing PCNA [PepsiCo's] trade secrets and confidential
information." 46 In reaching this decision, the court first interpreted the ITSA. The
47
plain language of the ITSA permits a court to enjoin the threat of misappropriation,
and the court held that a plaintiff may prove threatened misappropriation by
showing that the defendant will inevitably disclose the trade secrets in his new
employment. 48
The court found that Redmond would inevitably rely on the
information he gained at PepsiCo in his duties at Quaker, 49 and this use would
50
ultimately give Quaker a substantially unfair advantage over the competition.
In reaching the decision to use the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the Seventh
Circuit also looked at Redmond's behavior towards PepsiCo during and after his
negotiations with Quaker.5 1 The court found that Redmond's "lack of forthrightness"
52
when dealing with PepsiCo showed that he could not be trusted.
The court used the fact that PepsiCo offered more proof of the likelihood that
Redmond would disclose trade secrets5 3 to distinguish its holding from other cases in
which the court did not issue injunctions.5 4 The Seventh Circuit ultimately
concluded that "the district court correctly decided that PepsiCo demonstrated a
' 55
likelihood of success on its statutory claim of trade secret misappropriation."

46 Id. at 1272. When a party is seeking an injunction they must prove not only the existence of
a trade secret, but also that it was misappropriated. Td. at 1268. In so holding, the court was
interpreting the language of the ITSA § 1065/3(a) (1988), which provides that a court may enjoin the
"actual or threatened misappropriation" of a trade secret.
47 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1065/3 (1988). See also text accompanying note 13.
48 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. See also 1 JAGER, supra note 11, § 7:6 (noting that the allegation
is not based on the employee's conscious or unconscious acts, rather it is based on whether the
disclosure of the trade secrets is inevitable).
49 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. The Seventh Circuit adopted the district court's ruling that,
'unless Redmond possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize information, he would
necessarily be making decisions about Gatorade and Snapple by relying on his knowledge of PCNA
[PepsiCo] trade secrets." Id. at 1269.
5o Id. at 1270. The Seventh Circuit uses the analogy that PepsiCo is in the position of a coach,
and Redmond is like a player who left, playbook in hand, to play for the opposing team right before
the big game. Id.
o1
52

Id.
Id. Redmond lied to PepsiCo in the time between his negotiations with Quaker when he

actually accepted the position, and when he informed PepsiCo that he had taken a job with their
competitor. Id. From this behavior, the court concluded that Redmond "could not be trusted to act
with the necessary sensitivity and good faith under the circumstances in which the only practical
verification that he was not using plaintiffs secrets would be defendant Redmond's word to that
effect." Id.
53 Id. An example of the extra "proof' the court found PepsiCo offered was the fact that
Redmond had lied to PepsiCo employees about the job at Quaker. Id.
54 See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (dismissing the plaintiffs cause of action and holding that the defendant's acts of working for
the plaintiff, knowing the business, leaving the business to work for a competitor, and hiring
employees from the plaintiff, were not enough to establish a claim for threatened misappropriation);
see also, e.g, AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying the plaintiff a
preliminary injunction and holding that the fact that a person takes on a similar position at a
competitor, does not, without more, show that trade secrets or confidential information will be
inevitably
disclosed).
55 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271.
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II.

THE INEVITABLE MISTAKES FOLLOWING PEPSICO

Since the PepsiCo decision in 1995, the Illinois courts have not had many
opportunities to implement the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The following is an
analysis of some of the cases involving various Illinois courts and their decisions
regarding the inevitable disclosure doctrine in light of PepsiCo.
A. Advent Electronics,Inc. v. Buckman 56
In this Seventh Circuit case, the plaintiff, Advent, provided electronic
components and services to equipment manufacturers. 57 Buckman, the defendant,
owned Finnigan Electronics, Inc., a company that distributed and manufactured
electronic components. 58 In 1993, Advent bought substantially all of Finnigan
Electronics' assets. 59 The parties entered into a purchase agreement, which included
a non-competition agreement 60 and an employment agreement. 61 In 1994, Advent
fired Buckman pursuant to the employment agreement. 62 After Buckman left
63
Advent, he opened his own business as a distributor of electronic components.
Advent sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit Buckman from violating the
non-competition agreement and they sought a declaratory judgment to determine the
enforceability of the non-competition agreement. 64 Advent claimed that Buckman
entered into a business that directly competed with them and that he made sales to
65
Advent's customers in violation of the non-competition agreement.
The court held that under Illinois law, it is improper to enforce a noncompetition agreement simply because it exists. 66 The court remanded the case to
the district court to determine if Advent had a legitimate business interest that

56 112 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding the case to the district court for them to
determine whether the plaintiff had a legitimate business interest i.e. a trade secret that needed to
be protected by an injunction that would enjoin the defendant from engaging in conduct that was in
competition with the plaintiff).
57Id.at 269.
58 Id.
59 d
6o Id. The non-competition agreement restricted Buckman from working directly or indirectly
in a business that competes with Advent and from soliciting orders for products substantially
similar to Finnigan's in its territory for two years. Id.
61 Id. at 269-70. The employment agreement made Buckman the Missouri branch general
manager and restricted Buckman's individual ability to compete for Advent's customers while he
was employed by Advent and for two years following the end of that employment. Id. at 270.
62 Id. at 270. The Missouri branch that Buckman was in charge of failed to meet the net sales
required in the employment agreement. Id.
(3

Jd

6 Id.at 271.
( Id.at 270.
(3 Id. at 274. In Illinois, non-competition clauses are disfavored and a court will only enforce
provisions that are "reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest or to prevent
improper and unfair competition." Id. (citing Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1983)); see
also inf a note 114 and accompanying text (discussing more factors that courts examine when
determining the enforceability of non-competition agreements).
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needed protection. 67 The Advent court never analyzed the inevitable disclosure
doctrine because a non-competition agreement existed. However, the danger that the
freedom to contract will be destroyed under the inevitable disclosure doctrine still
exists because the court could have ignored the non-competition agreement and could
have implemented a judicially created "agreement" enjoining Buckman in any way
the court saw fit.
B. StrataMarketing,Inc. v. Murphy8
69
In this case, the plaintiff, Strata, appealed a decision dismissing its complaint,
which sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to prohibit defendant,
Murphy, from accepting or continuing employment with Marketing Resources Plus
(hereinafter "MRP") and from disclosing confidential information.70 The appellate
court reversed and remanded the case because they found Strata's allegations
71
sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.

Strata developed software programs, 7 2 and its main competitor was MRP, a
division of VNU.7 3 Murphy worked at Strata as a sales representative, a job that
required her to service and solicit customers.7 4 In beginning her employment with
Strata, Murphy agreed to sign a confidentiality agreement, which restricted her
employee mobility upon leaving Strata.7 5 When Murphy left Strata, she accepted a
position with MRP as a sales representative.7 6 Strata subsequently brought suit.
The appellate court, in determining if Strata's allegations were sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss, examined Strata's contention that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine should be adopted.77 The court reviewed the PepsiCodecision and
stated, "[wie believe PepsiCo correctly interprets Illinois law and agree that
inevitable disclosure is a theory upon which a plaintiff in Illinois can proceed under
67 Advent,

112 F.3d at 274.
740 N.E.2d 1166, 1179 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff plead the allegations
sufficiently to withstand a motion to dismiss and remanding the case for judgment on the merits).
69 Strata, 740 N.E.2d at 1168.
70 Id. at 1169. Strata also sought to prohibit MRP from employing Murphy and to obtain
further damages as the court deemed appropriate. Id.
71 Id. at 1179. The court set forth that they made no comment or judgment on the merits of the
68

case and that Strata would have to prove each element to the trial court. Id.
72 Id. at 1168. Strata maintained "a very unique and small niche" of the software market -

they developed software that analyzes and enhances data provided by radio and television rating
programs. Id.
73 Id. VNU was a co-defendant in the case Strata brought against Murphy. Id.
74 Id. Murphy was provided with appointments, sales leads, and prospective and existing
customer lists. Id.
75Id.at 1169. The confidentiality agreement stated in pertinent part:
[D]uring the period of her employment with Strata and for a year following her
termination from Strata .... she will not render, directly or indirectly .... any

services of an advisory or consulting nature or as an employee or otherwise to any

business which is a competitor of Strata, including but not limited to .. .MMP
[subsequently known as MRP].
Id.
76

Jd

77Id.at 1177.
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the Act."78 The court reviewed the complaint and determined that it sufficiently
alleged inevitable disclosure because it stated that Murphy, in her new job, could not
help but use her knowledge of Strata's pricing structure, of planned product upgrades
79
and enhancements, and of existing customer contacts.
The Strata case was remanded and as of yet has not been decided.
A
confidentiality agreement existed in this case and still the court was willing to
explore the notion of inevitable disclosure. On remand, the trial court could entirely
wipe out the confidentiality agreement that the parties came up with and implement
an injunction on Murphy that might restrict her employee mobility even more than
the contract that she willingly agreed to.
80
C. Complete Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. Mauro

The plaintiff, Complete Business Solutions, Inc. (hereinafter "CBSI"), sued
defendants, Mauro and Encore Consulting Services, Inc. (hereinafter "ECSI"), to
enforce the confidentiality provisions in Mauro's employment agreement from the
time that the court would order the injunction, rather than from the one-year from
81
termination date expressed in the agreement.
Mauro worked for CBSI for approximately two years before he resigned on
February 18, 2000.82 Upon his resignation, Mauro signed a separation agreement,
which included confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses.8 3 In Mauro's position at
84
ECSI, he solicited some of CBSI's clients.
The court found that the CBSI information that Mauro obtained was in fact
trade secrets, but that CBSI failed to show that Mauro actually used the trade

78

Id. at 1178.

Id. The court determined that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Murphy could not
operate or function without relying on Strata's alleged trade secrets. Id. at 1179.
80 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3132, *16 (N.D. Ill. March 15, 2001) (holding that defendant's motion
to dismiss was granted in part because plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that defendant actually
misappropriated their trade secrets).
81 Mauro, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3132, at *6 n.i.
CBSI learned of Mauro's alleged breach of
the agreement months before the confidentiality and non-solicitation provisions were going to
expire. Id.
Essentially, CBSI was requesting that the twelve-month duration period in the
agreement begin with the court's order rather than with the time of Mauro's termination. Id.
82 Id.at *3.
83 Id. at *34.The agreement stated, in part:
Employee acknowledges that during the course of Employee's employment with
the Company, Employee may have been exposed to Trade Secrets and
Confidential Information of the Company. Employee agrees that Employee will
not use or disclose any Trade Secrets or Confidential Information . . .for twelve
(12) months following his employment termination date ...For a period of one (1)
year following his employment termination date, Employee will not, directly or
indirectly, on Employee's own behalf or in the service of or on behalf of any other.
•.solicit or attempt to divert or solicit any individual or entity to provide services
or products ... that are substantially similar to those provided by the Company, if
such individual or entity: (i) is or was a client of Company ....
7)

Id.
84 Id.at *56. Mauro offered ECSJ's services to Ameritech and Boise Cascade, two of CBSI's
customers. Id.
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secrets in his solicitation of CBSI's clients.8 5 The court found that Mauro could
misuse the information and that they feared that he would8 6 The court went on to
address CBSI's allegation involving the inevitable disclosure doctrine.8 7 While the
court held that CBSI failed to properly plead that Mauro would inevitably use the
confidential information, it suggested that CBSI should amend their complaint to
show that Mauro could not operate without inevitably disclosing the confidential
information.8 8 This suggested invocation of the inevitable disclosure doctrine8 9 is
unusual because a confidentiality agreement already existed; which does not invoke
the clear standards needed for the adoption of the doctrine.
D. Telular Corp. v. Vox2, Ine.90
The Telular case presents a different possible use of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. The plaintiff, Telular, brought a patent infringement action against the
defendant, Vox2. 9 1 While preparing for litigation, the parties executed a protective
93
order 92 governing any confidential information that was disclosed during discovery.
8' Id. at *16. In order to state a claim for misappropriation under the ITSA, a plaintiff must
plead that the information was: 1) a trade secret; 2) misappropriated; and 3) used in the defendant's
business. Id. at *5; see also Abbott Labs v. Chiron Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5596, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. April 23,

1997) (holding that plaintiffs allegations of trade

secret misappropriation were

somewhat deficient because essentially the allegation amounted to the fact that defendant could
misuse trade secrets and plaintiffs feared that they would).
8 Mauro, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3132, at *16. The complaint alleged that "Mauro has used
and/or will necessarily be called upon to use and disclose such information in improperly soliciting
Ameritech." Id. at *16 n.7. The court determined that this information was not enough to show
actual misappropriation. Id. at *16. See also, e.g., Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 357, stating that: "All
that is alleged, at bottom, is that defendants could misuse plaintiffs secrets, and plaintiffs fear they
will. This is not enough. It may be that little more is needed, but falling a little short is still falling
short."
87Mauro, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3132, at *17-20. The court discussed cases that have applied
the inevitable disclosure doctrine and stated that in order for the doctrine to apply, the defendant
must not be able to operate without relying on plaintiffs trade secrets. [d.at *17.
88Id. at *19.
89 Id. at *19-20; compare id. with Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 356 which states that, "[a]n
allegation that the defendants said they would use secrets or disavowed their confidentiality
agreements would serve this purpose. An allegation that Clear [defendant] could not operate
without Teradyne's [plaintiffs] secrets ... would suffice ....".
90 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7472, *10 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2001) (holding that a defendant
company's unsubstantiated fear that a trial expert, who was made privy to their trade secrets for
litigation purposes, may compete with them in the future is not sufficient to demonstrate a risk of
inevitable disclosure that outweighs the plaintiffs right to use the expert of its choice).
91 Telular, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7472 at *2. The patent at issue in the case belonged to
Telular and related to an interface device for standard telephones in order to control the operation of
a cellular transceiver. Id.
92 The definition of a "protective order" is: [A] court order prohibiting or restricting a party
from engaging in a legal procedure (esp. discovery) that unduly annoys or burdens the opposing
party or a third-party witness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (7th ed. 1999).
9 Telular, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7472 at *2. The protective order provided that "confidential
information may be provided to experts who are independent of and not employed by the parties or a
competitor of either party in the field to which the subject matter of this action pertains and who are
retained for purposes of this action." Id. at *23.
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O'Brien, Telular's expert, worked as the sales director at Digi-Tel Communications,
LLC (hereinafter "Digi-Tel"). 94 As sales director, O'Brien's duties entailed managing
sales efforts, developing indirect market channels for different equipment, developing
business-to-business Internet based sales channels, and opening new distribution
locations. 95 Vox2 argued that O'Brien would inevitably misuse Vox2's confidential
information. More specifically, they argued that Digi-Tel might sell a cellular
interface that competes with their product in the future and then O'Brien would be
working for a competitor.

96

In determining whether O'Brien should be privy to the confidential information
as Telular's expert, the court weighed Telular's interest in choosing an expert with
Vox2's interest in protecting its trade secrets from inevitable disclosure. 97 The court
held that O'Brien was allowed access to Vox2's confidential material only for
purposes of the litigation and that he was bound by the protective order. 98 The court
stated that Vox2 had not demonstrated that O'Brien would inevitably use the trade
secrets in performing his duties at Digi-Tel, and that Vox2's fear that Digi-Tel may
someday become a competitor did not outweigh Telular's right to choose the expert of
its choice. 99 The court in this case had the potential to expand the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure to a person outside the scope of the employer/employee
relationship. 10 0 Fortunately, the court denied this request and even hinted at the
idea that courts should consider certain factors, like "bad faith"10 1 and the likelihood
of disclosure,10 2 when deciding to implement the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
103
E. Automed Technologies,Inc. v. Eller et a].

Plaintiff, Automed, designed automated medical dispensing systems and
defendants,1 0 4 Eller and Youngs, were top employees who supervised the research
and development of new and existing products. 10 5 On April 9, 1999, Eller officially

94

Id. at *3.

95 Id.
96 Id. at *4 *5. Vox2 develops, manufactures, and markets through distributors the Vox.Link,
a cellular accessory. -d. at *5. Digi-Tel distributes cellular phones and accessories manufactured by
other companies and also sells the services of companies that provide cellular service plans. Id
97 Id. at *3.
98 Id. at "1011.
99 Id.at *6. The court mentioned that unlike Redmond in the PepsiCo case, whose lack of
forthrightness led the court to believe a real threat of disclosure existed, O'Brien readily agreed to
be bound by the protective order and to use the information only in context of the pending litigation.
Id.
100 The court specifically discussed that O'Brien was not an employee of either Telular or Vox2.
Id. at *10.
101Id.at *6.
102 Id. at *10.
103 160 F.Supp.2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion
to dismiss; dismissing the common law relating to trade secrets and holding that the complaint was
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss at that point in the proceedings even though specific
trade secrets would have to be made more specific).
104 The defendants in Automed included: Charles Eller, Herb Youngs and Pegg, Inc. d/b/a Sun
Designs, Inc. Id.
105 Id.at 919. Eller initially worked, pursuant to a non-competition agreement that survived
termination of his employment, for Travenol Laboratories, Inc., which was then bought out by
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accepted a position with Automed without signing a non-competition agreement, and
Youngs signed an employment agreement, which included non-competition and nondisclosure provisions. 10 6 Automed began developing a new product that Eller,
Youngs, and a subcontractor, Sun Designs, all worked on. 10 7 Due to their positions,
all three of the defendants were privy to Automed confidential information and trade
secrets.1OS
In the meantime, Automed began work on another system, the MegaPharmacy
Project, that the defendants worked on with Express Scripts, a mail order
pharmaceutical distributor. 10 9 Early in 2001, Eller and Youngs left Automed to work
for Express Scripts, where they were assigned to continue work on the
MegaPharmacy and they contracted Sun Designs to perform services similar to those
they performed for Automed. 110
Automed brought suit against the defendants alleging misappropriation of
trade secrets and breach of contract under various legal theories,11 1 including the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. 112 Automed alleged that the defendants' prior
positions with their company made them privy to confidential information and trade
secrets, and by the nature of their work with Express Scripts, use of the information
could be inferred. 113 The court held that the facts alleged in the complaint, which
included that the defendants were assigned to work on the same project they had
been developing for Automed, were sufficient to state a claim based on the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. 114 Again, the court allowed a claim based on the inevitable
disclosure doctrine even when non-competition agreements existed. 115 Allowing both
Baxter Healthcare Corp. Id. Baxter then sold its productivity systems unit, for which Eller worked,
to Automed under an agreement that assigned certain of Baxter's intellectual property and trade
secret rights to Automed. Id. The agreement also assigned Baxter's rights under employee
confidentiality agreements to Automed. Id.
106

Id. at 919.

107 Id. at 920.
108

Id.

109 Id.
110

Id.

[d. at 919. Some of the other legal theories that Automed based their claims on were the
Illinois Trade Secrets Act, conversion, corporate opportunity, common law misappropriation, breach
of contract and fiduciary duty, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealings, and conspiracy. Id.
at n.1.
112 Id.
at 921. The court stated that to invoke the inevitable disclosure doctrine, "the complaint
must do more than make conclusory allegations that the employees will necessarily use trade
secrets in their new positions." -d. (citing Mauro, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3132, at *5 n.7).
H:3Id.
114 Id.
The complaint specifically alleged that, "[h]iring the former Vice President and General
Manager of Systems Engineering (Eller) and the Director of Research and Development and
Software Development (Youngs), who headed the MegaPharmacy Project, and then assigning them
to the same project, supports an inference that defendants are using information acquired from
plaintiff." Id.
115 Id.
at 923 (discussing the factors that need to be examined when determining the
enforceability of restrictive covenant, or non-competition agreement). These factors include the
following: 1) the non-competition clauses must be limited in duration and geographic range, 2) the
clauses must be reasonable, 3) the employer's interest must be legitimate, 4) and the employee must
maintain the ability to earn a living in their field. Id. Like non-competition agreements and their
negative effect on trade, the inevitable disclosure doctrine has negative effects including restricting
employee mobility and destroying the freedom to contract.
Therefore, similar factors for
111
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sort of claims leaves room for the deciding court to protect trade secrets in any
manner they see fit,116 even if it means dismissing an agreed upon contract and
implementing a new contract under the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
The analysis of the case law following the PepsiCo decision does not clearly
indicate that the Illinois courts are creating previously non-existing agreements.
However, the simple fact that the courts can use the inevitable disclosure doctrine
without limits to create such agreements should be enough for the people of Illinois
to confront the problem before it becomes an inevitable mistake.

III. AVOIDING THE INEVITABLE MISTAKES

The ultimate problem with the inevitable disclosure doctrine is that judicially
117
created agreements destroy the freedom to contract and restrict employee mobility.
Additionally, the policies supporting the inevitable disclosure doctrine are ultimately
the same as those that support non-competition agreements. 118 For example, both
inevitable disclosure1 19 and non-competition agreements 120 seek to protect employers
from trade secret misappropriation.
Courts, in implementing the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, seem to be adopting policy that they have continually denied
121
through striking down non-competition agreements.

implementing and enforcing the inevitable disclosure doctrine should be adopted.
116 Id. at 923.
The court stated, "[a]lthough Illinois views some restrictive covenants
suspiciously as restraints on trade, it will enforce them to protect trade secrets." Id. (citing
Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 443 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997)). However, non-competition contracts are not always enforceable because the factors create
room for the courts to determine whether or not they should be enforced.
117
As Judge Learned Hand observed:
[I]t has never been thought actionable to take away another's employee, when the
defendant wants to use him in his own business, however much the plaintiff may
suffer. It is difficult to see how servants could get the full value of their services
on any other terms; time creates no prescriptive right in other men's labor. If an
employer expects so much,he must secure it by [a]contract [not to compete].
Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 934 (1929). See also Whaley, supra note
19, at 846.
Although it may be fair to restrict an employee from competing or disclosing
information when she has bargained and contracted for those limitations, it is
very destructive both to employment relations and to judicial resources to allow
employers who have failed to obtain an express agreement to prevent an employee
from working for a competitor.

Id.
118 See infra part I (discussing the policies supporting both the inevitable disclosure doctrine
and non-competition agreements).
119 See Whaley, supra note 19, at 838.
120 See 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 13:4.
121 See Hamler, supra note 30, at 389 (explaining the policies against the enforcement of noncompetition agreements). The policies of free mobility of labor, an employee's livelihood and
violation of rights, and the restraint on trade can also apply in an argument against the adoption of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Id.; see also Edelstein, supra note 18, at 735.
Although the arguments expressed by proponents of both sides of this dilemma
are understandable, an inevitable disclosure theory that allows employers to
prevent an employee from working for a competitor in the employee's area of
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With the looming notion that non-competition agreements are strictly
construed and often not enforced, 122 employers should enter into reasonable
confidentiality agreements with their employees. Confidentiality agreements are
preferred over non-competition agreements. Confidentiality agreements simply keep
former employees from disclosing the former employer's trade secrets, they do not
impose actual restraints on employee mobility. 123 Confidentiality agreements work
to the advantage of the employee because he or she maintains mobility in the
workforce. 124 Confidentiality agreements also work to the advantage of the employer
because their secrets remain undisclosed, and if the employee breaks the agreement,
contract remedies are available.
A confidentiality agreement existed between Redmond and PepsiCo in the
PepsiCo case. 125 The court acknowledged that the confidentiality agreement was
valid and enforceable, 126 but it found, in spite of the confidentiality agreement,
Redmond's disclosure of PepsiCo's trade secrets was inevitable. 127 The court held
that "inevitable" breaches of contract may be enjoined.128
While the ITSA clearly allows a court to enjoin "threatened
misappropriation," there is little case law, besides PepsiCo and the few cases that
129
followed, that establishes what constitutes threatened or inevitable disclosure.
This lack of guidance allows judicially created contracts, which may include
provisions that restrain employee mobility, to be implemented at the various courts'
discretions. Since the effects of the inevitable disclosure doctrine can be devastating
to former employees and contract principles, the Illinois Supreme Court or the
legislature should create guidelines 130 for the courts to follow when deciding whether
to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Guidelines would force the courts to
engage in a fact-based inquiry using only critical, precisely defined factors to
determine if, in fact, the disclosure of the trade secrets at issue is inevitable.
The following are some suggested guidelines that would help to create
expertise for an unlimited amount of time and without any compensation to the
employee is a menacing restriction.

Id.
122 So/Ross, 522 N.E.2d at 1339.
123 See 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 13:3. Court's generally uphold confidentiality agreements
where adequate consideration supports the agreement. Id.
124 Id. "Confidentiality agreements are an effective tool in the maintenance of commercial
morality and in promoting invention and innovation." Id. (citing Vt. Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk
Inc., 88 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1996)).
125 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. For the exact words of the confidentiality agreement see supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
126 Id. at 1272 n.1O.
127 Id. at 1272.
128 Id.

129 Id. at 1268. For the language of the ITSA, see supra note 12 and supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
1:30The Federal Circuit established similar guidelines for courts to examine when determining
whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate in a patent infringement case. DONALD S. CHISUM
ET AL, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1224 (2d ed. 2001). These guidelines, or factors, include the
following: 1) the likelihood that the patentee will succeed on the merits of the case, 2) that the
patentee will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not awarded, 3) that the balance of
hardships tips in the patentee's favor, and 4) the impact on the public, if any. Id. The court has also
found that factors one and two are the most important. Id.
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judicial uniformity in using the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The guidelines would
also help strike a balance between the employee's right to choose his or her
profession and the employer's right to protect its intellectual property.131 The first
factor to analyze is the competitiveness of the former and future employers. 132 In
order for trade secret disclosure to be damaging to the former employer, the future
employer, to whom the information would be going, must truly be in competition with
the former employer. Being in competition means that both employers are producing
the same or similar products or services and the trade secret information that an
133
employee has acquired will benefit the business of the second employer.
The second factor for the courts to analyze is whether the former employer
has had success in an area that the future employer strives for and has the capital to
achieve. 13 4 The future employer must want the information that the employee would
inevitably reveal and he or she must have the means to achieve the success that the
trade secret holds.
Third, the court should examine the value of the trade secret.1 35 The value of
the trade secret must be so great that protecting it justifies restricting an employee's
mobility. The court should inquire about the time and financial resources invested in
protecting trade secrets.1 36 Additionally, the court should consider the value of the
trade secret/information to the competitor, the time-period that this value is likely to
last, the time it took the former employer to gather the information, and the actual
1 37
information itself.
Fourth, the courts, when implementing the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
should carefully look at any similarities between the employee's former and future
job positions. 13 8 If the employee is moving to a position at a competitor's company
that requires different duties than those that made him or her privy to confidential
information, inevitable disclosure is unlikely. The new position must be almost
identical, entailing the same responsibilities and tasks. 13 9 The new position must be
one so that it would be nearly impossible for the employee not to use the confidential

131According to Miller, supra note 1, at § 4, "[e]xplicit guidance is needed, however, in order to
ensure this balance is maintained."
132 Whaley, supra note 19, at 848.
133 Id.,* see also Victoria A. Cundiff, Hiring Competitors' Employees: A Trade Secrets
Perspective, Simple Rules of Thumb Can Be Misleading,N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, at S2 (stating that
while Microsoft and a small software applications development company both make software, there
may not be substantial overlap in the companies' products to establish competition).
134 Seo Cundiff, supra note 133, § 2 (giving the example that a high-tech employee's move to a
company that has little ability to invest in the technology contained in the confidential information
poses little risk).
135 Whaley, supra note 19, at 848.
:36 See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264 (noting that PepsiCo required all management
employees, who were privy to confidential information, to sign confidentiality agreements). For
more examples of how companies attempt to protect their trade secrets see Marriott, supra note 2
and accompanying text.
137 Whaley, supra note 19, at 848. Whaley also notes that the court should ask if the first to
market is a concern for the employers. Id.
138 Id. at 849.
139Telular illustrates a good example of a person who was privy to the plaintiffs confidential
information but who was not likely to disclose the information in his everyday business as a sales
director. Telular, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7472 at *2.
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information that he or she was privy to at his or her previous job.140
Fifth, the courts should examine the quality and quantity of the employee's
actual knowledge of the confidential information. 141 The court must look beyond the
142
employee's positions and focus on the actual confidential information at issue.
This factor involves an examination of that which the employee actually did at his or
her former job and it seeks to determine the amount of knowledge the employee has
about the employer's trade secrets.1 43 The court, after determining "how intimately
the employee knows the information, " 144 can then make a determination as to
whether the doctrine applies.
Sixth, the court should examine all of the employee's employment options.
The court should ask whether the employee can get another job or whether this is the
only position in which the employee can use his or her skills. 145 If the employee has
numerous options in the same job market, inevitable disclosure would not really
restrict employee mobility. However, if there are only two companies that make a
certain product or offer a certain service, it is not really fair to prohibit the employee
from working in the only other job where his or her skills can be used. 146
The seventh and last factor that courts should consider is any bad faith on
the part of the employee. 147 When the court in PepsiCo examined Redmond's bad
faith, they alluded to the idea that more than simple fear of misappropriation was
required to invoke the inevitable disclosure doctrine.1 48 Dishonesty on the part of the
employee and past and present behavior of the employee often indicate a willingness
to misappropriate the former employer's trade secrets and a likelihood that
misappropriation will occur. 149 Requiring a finding of bad faith on the part of the
employee will shield an employee acting in good faith from being restricted in their
employment options.

140 Whaley, supra note 19, at 849. Whaley states that, "a court should not grant an injunction
on the basis of unavoidable disclosure when an employee leaves a position in strategic planning to

work in a divisional sales office with a dissimilar and unrelated job description." Id. at n.273.
141 Id. at 849.
142 Sec PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1265-66. The court in PepsiCo did an extensive inquiry into the
information that Redmond acquired in his position at PepsiCo. Id
143 Id., see also Cundiff, supra note 133, at S7 (suggesting that questions like "[d]oes the
employee have high-level or in-depth knowledge of the ex-employer's secrets?" be asked when
determining whether the inevitable disclosure doctrine applies).
144 Whaley, supra note 19, at 849-50.
145 Id. at 850. If the answer to this question is that this job is the only job where the employee
can use his skills, the inevitable disclosure doctrine would act like a non-compete covenant in that it
would restrict the employee's mobility. According to Jager, "Unreasonable covenants that interfere
with a person's livelihood are against public policy." 2 JAGER, supra note 11, § 13:4.
'16 See Whaley, supra note 19, at 850.
147 Critics argue that the employee's intent should not be a factor because a finding that
disclosure will be inevitable is not influenced by the employee's good or bad faith. See Whaley,
supra note 19, at n.279.
148 PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. The court found that Redmond's lack of forthrightness and out
and out lies were evidence that he could not be trusted to act with the necessary sensitivity and good
faith under the circumstances in which the only verification that he was not misappropriating
PepsiCo's trade secrets was his word to that effect. Id.
14) See Miller, supra note 1, § 5 ("The evidence must indicate that misappropriation is
threatened, not simply inevitable.").
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IV. CONCLUSION

The inevitable disclosure doctrine has the potential to be a very destructive
judicial tool because it could restrain employee mobility and destroy the freedom to
contract. 150 However, the previously explained seven factors would give the Illinois
courts clear standards to determine whether the employee can perform his or her
new job without misappropriating his or her former employer's trade secrets. With
these guidelines, the courts will be able to strike a balance between protecting
employee mobility and the freedom to contract and protecting employer's trade
secret.

150 See Pooley, supra note 9, at 1186.

